KRT Wire | 12/29/2003 | Army deliberately shortchanged Guard on gear, officials say:
WASHINGTON - (KRT) - The deployment to Iraq of a combined Illinois-Iowa National Guard Chinook unit without required anti-missile defenses did not reflect an oversight or lack of coordination between the Guard and the Army.
Rather, it was the consequence of decisions made years ago by the Army to buy only a portion of the Guard's air defense equipment, senior Guard leaders say."In all likelihood," Goheen said, "the Persian Gulf War in 1991 was the last time in our lifetimes that you'll see another force take on U.S. forces in symmetrical fighting, mechanized force versus mechanized force. Our advantages in training, technology and communications really make that impossible. Our foes in Iraq realize that you don't want to tangle with our combat troops, with the infantry. You want to tangle with the supply lines, with the convoys.
"So everybody goes over as a combatant, and everybody has to be able to protect himself," Goheen said.
Maj. Gen. William Nash, first commander of U.S. forces in Bosnia, said equipment gaps were manageable as recently as in Bosnia but not in terrorist environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
And manpower requirements for the campaign against terrorism, including postwar stabilization, raise questions about the shift away from a traditional, heavy force, said Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., of the House Armed Services Committee.
"What is very clear is that the war on terrorism is intensely labor-intensive. We know that we are completely burning through the Guard and Reserves," she said. "How do we find a way to level the playing field when it comes to armaments, munitions, tactical equipment, communications equipment?""
WASHINGTON - (KRT) - The deployment to Iraq of a combined Illinois-Iowa National Guard Chinook unit without required anti-missile defenses did not reflect an oversight or lack of coordination between the Guard and the Army.
Rather, it was the consequence of decisions made years ago by the Army to buy only a portion of the Guard's air defense equipment, senior Guard leaders say."In all likelihood," Goheen said, "the Persian Gulf War in 1991 was the last time in our lifetimes that you'll see another force take on U.S. forces in symmetrical fighting, mechanized force versus mechanized force. Our advantages in training, technology and communications really make that impossible. Our foes in Iraq realize that you don't want to tangle with our combat troops, with the infantry. You want to tangle with the supply lines, with the convoys.
"So everybody goes over as a combatant, and everybody has to be able to protect himself," Goheen said.
Maj. Gen. William Nash, first commander of U.S. forces in Bosnia, said equipment gaps were manageable as recently as in Bosnia but not in terrorist environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
And manpower requirements for the campaign against terrorism, including postwar stabilization, raise questions about the shift away from a traditional, heavy force, said Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., of the House Armed Services Committee.
"What is very clear is that the war on terrorism is intensely labor-intensive. We know that we are completely burning through the Guard and Reserves," she said. "How do we find a way to level the playing field when it comes to armaments, munitions, tactical equipment, communications equipment?""
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