Westhawk: What if Mr. al-Maliki abandons Mr. Bush?
What if Mr. al-Maliki abandons Mr. Bush?
In spite of denials from White House staffers, it appears as if Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki snubbed U.S. President Bush today, cancelling a planned meeting in Amman, Jordan. According to Mr. Bush’s spokesman, the two leaders are to meet instead tomorrow.
A bit of kabuki theater may be occurring here. Moqtada al-Sadr, a seemingly reluctant parliamentary supporter of Mr. al-Maliki, threatened to withdraw his political support of the prime minister if Mr. al-Maliki met with the U.S. president. Today, al-Sadr carried out his threat, sort of. He and his parliamentary bloc are boycotting parliament, but only temporarily. In return for retaining al-Sadr’s support after this temporary display has ended, perhaps Mr. al-Maliki arranged to show some sign of independence and defiance of the U.S. government by snubbing Mr. Bush for a day.
Such theatrics aside, the serious policy discussion in Washington concerns how much longer America will sustain its venture in Iraq. In spite of Mr. Bush’s assurance that the U.S. commitment remains steadfast, the current conversations among Congressional leaders, anonymous murmurs from the Iraq Study Group, and jottings of Washington pundits center around diplomatic gambits, shifting military forces, redoubling advisor teams, establishing timetables, and other such tinkering. These discussions and ideas are merely euphemisms for how the U.S. can disengage from its commitment in Iraq.
Many observers have suggested that Mr. Bush should issue Mr. al-Maliki an ultimatum: crack down on the Shi’ite militias and respect the Sunni minority’s rights or the U.S. will leave the stage (Ambassador Dennis Ross proposed such a course, which we analyzed in this post).
But what if at their meeting tomorrow the Iraqi prime minister issued an ultimatum to the U.S. president? What if Mr. al-Maliki told Mr. Bush that America’s advice and assistance were no longer welcome? A few days ago, we described the unpleasant vise Mr. al-Maliki finds himself in:
The Iraqi prime minister has delayed as long as he could the tightening of this vise. But now, the pinching may really hurt. There are strong reasons for Mr. al-Maliki to jettison the Americans. First, the American demands are impossible to meet. There is no compromising with the Sunni Arabs – their alienation from the Shi’ites and Kurds is complete. Second, he cannot order the security forces to attack the Shi’ites. That would be the same as ordering the security forces to attack themselves. Even if most of the Shi’ites in the army and police are not members of al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, they are certainly sympathetic with that militia’s goals. They wish to protect their families and neighborhoods from Al Qaeda and the Baathists. And they don’t mind watching the Sunni holdouts, their former tormentors, get some payback. Third, unless he plans on exiling himself, Mr. al-Maliki, his ministers, associates, and officers must sleep in beds in Shi’ite neighborhoods. How comfortable can such sleep be if they spent that day blasting away at the people in those same neighborhoods?
What would Mr. al-Maliki lose by walking away from the U.S.? Would President Bush organize a coup in Baghdad and replace Mr. al-Maliki? Not likely – Iraqi sovereignty and democracy have been the whole purpose of the American project. And who would Mr. Bush put in Mr. al-Maliki’s place to implement the American program?
The U.S. could end its military mission in Iraq, withdrawing its combat formations and advisor teams. This would be great news, from Mr. al-Maliki’s perspective. From the Shi’ites’ point of view, it is the Americans that are preventing them from forcibly resettling the Sunni population out of greater Baghdad and thus ending the civil war. The Shi’ite militias, the Baghdad police, and Shi’ite-loyal soldiers already have all of the weapons, ammunition, and military training they need to accomplish their mission. For the Shi’ites, the sooner the Americans disengage the better.
Would Mr. Bush order the U.S. military to stand between the Iraqi government/Shi’ite forces and the Sunni Arab neighborhoods to prevent their ethnic cleansing? The Sunni Arabs have been responsible for the vast majority of American deaths in Iraq – how would Mr. Bush explain this policy to his countrymen? And how could he explain attacking the Iraqi security forces the U.S. has spent so much trying to build up?
Bush administration officials would not be wise to simply assume that Mr. al-Maliki and his associates have no choice but to continue to accept American aid and support. The conditions the Americans are putting on that aid and support may soon become unbearable for the Iraqi government. Mr. al-Maliki doesn’t like the vise he is caught in. It may make more sense for him to reject Mr. Bush than to reject his Shi’ite brothers.
And how might Mr. Bush receive this rejection, should it occur? Might he have to suppress a smile?
I found this blog called Westhawk recently, and it's really good stuff! The above is his most recent post.
What if Mr. al-Maliki abandons Mr. Bush?
In spite of denials from White House staffers, it appears as if Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki snubbed U.S. President Bush today, cancelling a planned meeting in Amman, Jordan. According to Mr. Bush’s spokesman, the two leaders are to meet instead tomorrow.
A bit of kabuki theater may be occurring here. Moqtada al-Sadr, a seemingly reluctant parliamentary supporter of Mr. al-Maliki, threatened to withdraw his political support of the prime minister if Mr. al-Maliki met with the U.S. president. Today, al-Sadr carried out his threat, sort of. He and his parliamentary bloc are boycotting parliament, but only temporarily. In return for retaining al-Sadr’s support after this temporary display has ended, perhaps Mr. al-Maliki arranged to show some sign of independence and defiance of the U.S. government by snubbing Mr. Bush for a day.
Such theatrics aside, the serious policy discussion in Washington concerns how much longer America will sustain its venture in Iraq. In spite of Mr. Bush’s assurance that the U.S. commitment remains steadfast, the current conversations among Congressional leaders, anonymous murmurs from the Iraq Study Group, and jottings of Washington pundits center around diplomatic gambits, shifting military forces, redoubling advisor teams, establishing timetables, and other such tinkering. These discussions and ideas are merely euphemisms for how the U.S. can disengage from its commitment in Iraq.
Many observers have suggested that Mr. Bush should issue Mr. al-Maliki an ultimatum: crack down on the Shi’ite militias and respect the Sunni minority’s rights or the U.S. will leave the stage (Ambassador Dennis Ross proposed such a course, which we analyzed in this post).
But what if at their meeting tomorrow the Iraqi prime minister issued an ultimatum to the U.S. president? What if Mr. al-Maliki told Mr. Bush that America’s advice and assistance were no longer welcome? A few days ago, we described the unpleasant vise Mr. al-Maliki finds himself in:
Mr. al-Maliki is caught in a political vise. On the one side, he is under extreme pressure from his remaining Shi’ite supporters to order the Shi’ite-dominated security forces to take the drastic and brutal actions necessary to end the Sunni Arab violence and terrorism. These actions, which would amount to the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from the greater Baghdad area, would appear to much of the world to be a war crime. The other side of the vise is the Americans, who are insisting that Mr. al-Maliki both compromise with the Sunnis and, as a corollary, crack down on al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, the main instigator of sectarian violence.
The Iraqi prime minister has delayed as long as he could the tightening of this vise. But now, the pinching may really hurt. There are strong reasons for Mr. al-Maliki to jettison the Americans. First, the American demands are impossible to meet. There is no compromising with the Sunni Arabs – their alienation from the Shi’ites and Kurds is complete. Second, he cannot order the security forces to attack the Shi’ites. That would be the same as ordering the security forces to attack themselves. Even if most of the Shi’ites in the army and police are not members of al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, they are certainly sympathetic with that militia’s goals. They wish to protect their families and neighborhoods from Al Qaeda and the Baathists. And they don’t mind watching the Sunni holdouts, their former tormentors, get some payback. Third, unless he plans on exiling himself, Mr. al-Maliki, his ministers, associates, and officers must sleep in beds in Shi’ite neighborhoods. How comfortable can such sleep be if they spent that day blasting away at the people in those same neighborhoods?
What would Mr. al-Maliki lose by walking away from the U.S.? Would President Bush organize a coup in Baghdad and replace Mr. al-Maliki? Not likely – Iraqi sovereignty and democracy have been the whole purpose of the American project. And who would Mr. Bush put in Mr. al-Maliki’s place to implement the American program?
The U.S. could end its military mission in Iraq, withdrawing its combat formations and advisor teams. This would be great news, from Mr. al-Maliki’s perspective. From the Shi’ites’ point of view, it is the Americans that are preventing them from forcibly resettling the Sunni population out of greater Baghdad and thus ending the civil war. The Shi’ite militias, the Baghdad police, and Shi’ite-loyal soldiers already have all of the weapons, ammunition, and military training they need to accomplish their mission. For the Shi’ites, the sooner the Americans disengage the better.
Would Mr. Bush order the U.S. military to stand between the Iraqi government/Shi’ite forces and the Sunni Arab neighborhoods to prevent their ethnic cleansing? The Sunni Arabs have been responsible for the vast majority of American deaths in Iraq – how would Mr. Bush explain this policy to his countrymen? And how could he explain attacking the Iraqi security forces the U.S. has spent so much trying to build up?
Bush administration officials would not be wise to simply assume that Mr. al-Maliki and his associates have no choice but to continue to accept American aid and support. The conditions the Americans are putting on that aid and support may soon become unbearable for the Iraqi government. Mr. al-Maliki doesn’t like the vise he is caught in. It may make more sense for him to reject Mr. Bush than to reject his Shi’ite brothers.
And how might Mr. Bush receive this rejection, should it occur? Might he have to suppress a smile?
I found this blog called Westhawk recently, and it's really good stuff! The above is his most recent post.
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