PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Spring 2004
Relearning
Counterinsurgency Warfare
ROBERT R. TOMES
copyright 2004 Robert R. Tomes
From Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 16-28.
Thirty years after the signing of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement ending the Vietnam War, the United States finds itself leading a broad coalition of military forces engaged in peacemaking, nation-building, and now counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq. A turning point appeared in mid-October 2003 when US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s memo on the future of Iraqi operations surfaced. His musings about whether US forces were ready for protracted guerrilla warfare sparked widespread debate about US planning for counterinsurgency operations.
Little attention has been paid to the theory and practice of counter-insurgency warfare in mainstream strategic studies journals. Discussions of the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) and RMA-associated technologies for battlefield surveillance and precision targeting dominated defense planning discourse in the 1990s. Nation-building and peacekeeping discussions rarely addressed counterinsurgency warfare, perhaps because nation-building operations during the 1990s did not confront a determined, violent insurgency. Meanwhile, with knowledge about counterinsurgency warfare waning among policymakers, resurgent terrorism scholarship and counter-terrorism policy initiatives avoided the issue of a strategic terrorist campaign to destabilize nation-building. More recently, vague historical references and misplaced analogies to Vietnam have muddled discussions of the Iraqi counterinsurgency effort.
Lessons and insights from past low-intensity wars deserve revisiting. They provide perspective as well as context for what may be a defining period for the American war on terrorism. What lessons from past counterinsurgencies can inform current efforts? What theoretical and operational issues are available to aid Coalition activities?
[...]
Those seeking historical insights into counterinsurgency warfare will find Roger Trinquier’s classic Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency disturbingly current. First published in 1961 and one of the best-selling post-World War II books in France, Trinquier influenced a generation of counterinsurgency scholarship. He succeeded in describing the true face of what current observers also label “modern war.” Nearly 40 years later, for example, Mark Bowden subtitled his bestseller Black Hawk Down, the story of a US Special Forces operation in Somalia gone awry, A Story of Modern War.1 Despite important differences between Somalia and the colonial independence conflicts Trinquier participated in, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect many of the nonlinear, unconventional elements of what Trinquier labeled modern war to distinguish between armored battles between nation-states and counterinsurgencies pitting nation-builders against organizations using terrorist tactics.
[...]
Relearning the Theory and Practice
of Counterinsurgency Warfare
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, penned by David Galula in 1964, provides a systematic discussion of how to defeat the insurgent—and the pitfalls along the way.12 Bernard Fall, author of the acclaimed Street Without Joy, considered Galula’s work the best “how-to” guide to counterinsurgency warfare. Experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria as a French military officer and attach� led Galula to consider the “need for a compass,” and prompted him to “define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics.”13
A simple theoretical construct underlies the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. It is the essence of what today’s theorists and strategists term asymmetric warfare: although an asymmetric distribution of resources and abilities actually favors counterinsurgent forces, they are often inappropriately wielded. The conflict is asymmetric because there is a “disproportion of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between their assets and liabilities.”14 At the conceptual level, the insurgent is endowed with the “ideological power of a cause on which to base his actions” and the counterinsurgent laden with a “heavy liability—he is responsible for maintaining order throughout the country” without undermining the ideals on which the new government is making its pleas for support.
[...]
What can be done? How can US military planners attack the intangible, political elements of the insurgency? Galula offers several routes to making “a body politic resistant to infection.”20 First is continuously reassessing the nature, scope, and degree of problems around the country. Anticipating problems and proactively addressing them leaves the insurgent without causes to exploit. Second, increase solidarity for the regime. Bring additional propaganda efforts to bear, including Arabic television broadcasts, that promote the new regime as something worth supporting and defending. Third, counterinsurgency leadership must maintain a high level of vigilance and support against the movement. Many times insurgencies will take strategic pauses to adapt, regroup, and develop new mobilization strategies. Too often a new regime will interpret this as victory and focus resources on regime-building. Counterinsurgencies are protracted struggles. Fourth, as Trinquier argued, intelligence and deep knowledge of the enemy are critical. Bringing new sources and methods to bear throughout the effort must be a priority. Too often, commanders consider their intelligence capabilities and tools as fixed resources across the insurgency. Today, there are countless remote sensing, information fusion, and surveillance capabilities available for incorporation into the toolbox. Many are ideally suited to the urban fight and can bolster human intelligence assets.
Relearning
Counterinsurgency Warfare
ROBERT R. TOMES
copyright 2004 Robert R. Tomes
From Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 16-28.
Thirty years after the signing of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement ending the Vietnam War, the United States finds itself leading a broad coalition of military forces engaged in peacemaking, nation-building, and now counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq. A turning point appeared in mid-October 2003 when US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s memo on the future of Iraqi operations surfaced. His musings about whether US forces were ready for protracted guerrilla warfare sparked widespread debate about US planning for counterinsurgency operations.
Little attention has been paid to the theory and practice of counter-insurgency warfare in mainstream strategic studies journals. Discussions of the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) and RMA-associated technologies for battlefield surveillance and precision targeting dominated defense planning discourse in the 1990s. Nation-building and peacekeeping discussions rarely addressed counterinsurgency warfare, perhaps because nation-building operations during the 1990s did not confront a determined, violent insurgency. Meanwhile, with knowledge about counterinsurgency warfare waning among policymakers, resurgent terrorism scholarship and counter-terrorism policy initiatives avoided the issue of a strategic terrorist campaign to destabilize nation-building. More recently, vague historical references and misplaced analogies to Vietnam have muddled discussions of the Iraqi counterinsurgency effort.
Lessons and insights from past low-intensity wars deserve revisiting. They provide perspective as well as context for what may be a defining period for the American war on terrorism. What lessons from past counterinsurgencies can inform current efforts? What theoretical and operational issues are available to aid Coalition activities?
[...]
Those seeking historical insights into counterinsurgency warfare will find Roger Trinquier’s classic Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency disturbingly current. First published in 1961 and one of the best-selling post-World War II books in France, Trinquier influenced a generation of counterinsurgency scholarship. He succeeded in describing the true face of what current observers also label “modern war.” Nearly 40 years later, for example, Mark Bowden subtitled his bestseller Black Hawk Down, the story of a US Special Forces operation in Somalia gone awry, A Story of Modern War.1 Despite important differences between Somalia and the colonial independence conflicts Trinquier participated in, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect many of the nonlinear, unconventional elements of what Trinquier labeled modern war to distinguish between armored battles between nation-states and counterinsurgencies pitting nation-builders against organizations using terrorist tactics.
[...]
Relearning the Theory and Practice
of Counterinsurgency Warfare
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, penned by David Galula in 1964, provides a systematic discussion of how to defeat the insurgent—and the pitfalls along the way.12 Bernard Fall, author of the acclaimed Street Without Joy, considered Galula’s work the best “how-to” guide to counterinsurgency warfare. Experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria as a French military officer and attach� led Galula to consider the “need for a compass,” and prompted him to “define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics.”13
A simple theoretical construct underlies the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. It is the essence of what today’s theorists and strategists term asymmetric warfare: although an asymmetric distribution of resources and abilities actually favors counterinsurgent forces, they are often inappropriately wielded. The conflict is asymmetric because there is a “disproportion of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between their assets and liabilities.”14 At the conceptual level, the insurgent is endowed with the “ideological power of a cause on which to base his actions” and the counterinsurgent laden with a “heavy liability—he is responsible for maintaining order throughout the country” without undermining the ideals on which the new government is making its pleas for support.
[...]
What can be done? How can US military planners attack the intangible, political elements of the insurgency? Galula offers several routes to making “a body politic resistant to infection.”20 First is continuously reassessing the nature, scope, and degree of problems around the country. Anticipating problems and proactively addressing them leaves the insurgent without causes to exploit. Second, increase solidarity for the regime. Bring additional propaganda efforts to bear, including Arabic television broadcasts, that promote the new regime as something worth supporting and defending. Third, counterinsurgency leadership must maintain a high level of vigilance and support against the movement. Many times insurgencies will take strategic pauses to adapt, regroup, and develop new mobilization strategies. Too often a new regime will interpret this as victory and focus resources on regime-building. Counterinsurgencies are protracted struggles. Fourth, as Trinquier argued, intelligence and deep knowledge of the enemy are critical. Bringing new sources and methods to bear throughout the effort must be a priority. Too often, commanders consider their intelligence capabilities and tools as fixed resources across the insurgency. Today, there are countless remote sensing, information fusion, and surveillance capabilities available for incorporation into the toolbox. Many are ideally suited to the urban fight and can bolster human intelligence assets.
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