Weak spy network hurt hunt for arms
By John Diamond, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON � Slightly more than a year before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the CIA launched a major effort to rebuild its network of Iraqi agents, which had been badly depleted by repeated purges, according to congressional and Bush administration officials with knowledge of the effort. (Related story: Broad purges wiped out most Iraqis helping CIA)
Despite the commitment of substantial resources, however, the CIA had only modest success in reconstituting its organization inside Iraq. By the end of 2002, Iraqis working for the CIA had begun providing helpful information about Iraq's conventional weapons and other matters relating to the looming U.S. invasion. But the agents had provided no incontrovertible evidence of chemical or biological weapons, the officials said.
The difficulty the CIA had keeping its Iraqi agents alive underscores the challenges U.S. intelligence faced in locating the banned weapons U.S. officials claimed Iraq had. The failure to find those weapons has raised doubts about how much U.S. intelligence really knew about them before the U.S. forces invaded Iraq � and whether the administration was candid about possible weaknesses in its information.
By John Diamond, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON � Slightly more than a year before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the CIA launched a major effort to rebuild its network of Iraqi agents, which had been badly depleted by repeated purges, according to congressional and Bush administration officials with knowledge of the effort. (Related story: Broad purges wiped out most Iraqis helping CIA)
Despite the commitment of substantial resources, however, the CIA had only modest success in reconstituting its organization inside Iraq. By the end of 2002, Iraqis working for the CIA had begun providing helpful information about Iraq's conventional weapons and other matters relating to the looming U.S. invasion. But the agents had provided no incontrovertible evidence of chemical or biological weapons, the officials said.
The difficulty the CIA had keeping its Iraqi agents alive underscores the challenges U.S. intelligence faced in locating the banned weapons U.S. officials claimed Iraq had. The failure to find those weapons has raised doubts about how much U.S. intelligence really knew about them before the U.S. forces invaded Iraq � and whether the administration was candid about possible weaknesses in its information.
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