FOXNews.com - Views - Heritage Foundation - Can the Guerrillas Win?
Even supporters of the Iraq war must be asking themselves: Do the insurgents have a chance of reversing the victory our troops won?
Two soldiers killed and their bodies mutilated, we hear one day. Not mutilated, just looted, we hear the next. Two helicopters shot down a few days earlier in Mosul, (search) a city we thought wed secured. And one fact looms large in almost every report -- that more American soldiers have died since President Bush declared an end to major combat operations on May 1 than during the war.
Slowly, the questions accumulate. Are we in too deep? Should we pull out? If so, when? How many casualties are acceptable to the American public? Is this another Vietnam?
A clearer look at the evidence suggests we're closer to victory than one might suspect. The latest intelligence puts the number of active Iraqi guerrillas at 5,000 and sympathizers at around 50,000. The insurgents have plenty of firepower, including assault rifles, explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades and a number of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. And their funding appears sufficient to pay young men as much as $5,000 to risk an attack against American forces.
But an insurgency requires several other elements to succeed: popular support, money, weapons and a safe haven to hide, train and plan. The Baathist insurgency has adequate arms but little else.
The Pentagon says most of the insurgents are former Baath Party officials and other Saddam loyalists and nearly all are part of Iraq's Sunni Arab minority, which represents about a fifth of the population. Most don't figure to fare well in a new, democratic Iraq. Under Saddam, himself a Sunni, this sect held sway over the Shia in the south, who account for 65 percent of the population, and the Kurds in the north, who make up most of the rest.
Even now, the Sunnis have little influence outside the Baathist/Sunni triangle (search), which extends just north and west of Baghdad. Little terror activity occurs outside this area, and American generals say their best intelligence on the insurgence comes from other Iraqis fed up with the resistance.
Beyond spurring opposition to foreign occupation, the Baathists lack a credible ideology to inspire new recruits. Returning Saddam to power generates little enthusiasm anywhere in Iraq, and, according to a recent study by Baghdad University, 71.5 percent of Iraqis favor the occupation, at least on a temporary basis.
The guerrillas' strategies indicate their lack of support. They use tactics common in the first phase of an urban-guerrilla campaign, such as sniping, attacking vehicles or buildings with rockets or mortars, and planting explosive devices. But they appear to lack the popular support for other tactical options, such as provocative political activity, widespread demonstrations to disrupt government services or massing crowds to lure occupation forces into traps.
Even supporters of the Iraq war must be asking themselves: Do the insurgents have a chance of reversing the victory our troops won?
Two soldiers killed and their bodies mutilated, we hear one day. Not mutilated, just looted, we hear the next. Two helicopters shot down a few days earlier in Mosul, (search) a city we thought wed secured. And one fact looms large in almost every report -- that more American soldiers have died since President Bush declared an end to major combat operations on May 1 than during the war.
Slowly, the questions accumulate. Are we in too deep? Should we pull out? If so, when? How many casualties are acceptable to the American public? Is this another Vietnam?
A clearer look at the evidence suggests we're closer to victory than one might suspect. The latest intelligence puts the number of active Iraqi guerrillas at 5,000 and sympathizers at around 50,000. The insurgents have plenty of firepower, including assault rifles, explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades and a number of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. And their funding appears sufficient to pay young men as much as $5,000 to risk an attack against American forces.
But an insurgency requires several other elements to succeed: popular support, money, weapons and a safe haven to hide, train and plan. The Baathist insurgency has adequate arms but little else.
The Pentagon says most of the insurgents are former Baath Party officials and other Saddam loyalists and nearly all are part of Iraq's Sunni Arab minority, which represents about a fifth of the population. Most don't figure to fare well in a new, democratic Iraq. Under Saddam, himself a Sunni, this sect held sway over the Shia in the south, who account for 65 percent of the population, and the Kurds in the north, who make up most of the rest.
Even now, the Sunnis have little influence outside the Baathist/Sunni triangle (search), which extends just north and west of Baghdad. Little terror activity occurs outside this area, and American generals say their best intelligence on the insurgence comes from other Iraqis fed up with the resistance.
Beyond spurring opposition to foreign occupation, the Baathists lack a credible ideology to inspire new recruits. Returning Saddam to power generates little enthusiasm anywhere in Iraq, and, according to a recent study by Baghdad University, 71.5 percent of Iraqis favor the occupation, at least on a temporary basis.
The guerrillas' strategies indicate their lack of support. They use tactics common in the first phase of an urban-guerrilla campaign, such as sniping, attacking vehicles or buildings with rockets or mortars, and planting explosive devices. But they appear to lack the popular support for other tactical options, such as provocative political activity, widespread demonstrations to disrupt government services or massing crowds to lure occupation forces into traps.
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